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IN RE GIBBONS'
(decided October 10, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
In a per curiam opinion, the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the decision of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct remov-
ing the petitioner, the Honorable Kenneth W. Gibbons, from his
office of Justice of the Glenville Town Court, Schenectady County,
for disclosing to the attorney for a car dealership that he had just
signed a search warrant to search the dealership premises for haz-
ardous wastes. 2 The court held that the petitioner's conduct went
beyond "simple careless inattention to the applicable ethical stan-
dards," but instead it manifested an "utter disregard for the Canons
of Judicial Ethics" warranting his removal from office.
3
II. BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2000, the New York State Commission on Judi-
cial Conduct ("Commission") served a Formal Written Complaint,
on the petitioner, the Honorable Kenneth W. Gibbons, a Justice of
the Glenville Town Court, Schenectady County, containing one
charge of judicial misconduct.4 The formal charge alleged that af-
ter the petitioner signed a search warrant authorizing the Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") to search the
premises of Capitaland Motors ("Capitaland") car dealership for
hazardous wastes, he telephoned the dealership's attorney, Mr.
Towne, and informed him of the impending search. 5
The Commission ordered an evidentiary hearing regarding
this allegation of the petitioner's misconduct, and on January 2,
2001, it designated William C. Banks, Esq., as Referee to hear and
1. 98 N.Y.2d 448 (2002).
2. Id. at 450.
3. Id.
4. See decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at http:/
/www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/G/gibbons.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2003).
5. See Gibbons, 98 N.Y.2d at 449.
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report proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 6 The Refe-
ree held a hearing on July 10, 2001, and filed his report with the
Commission on September 6, 2001. 7 In this report, the Referee
stated that the petitioner acknowledged that he informed the attor-
ney for the dealership about the impending search warrant, how-
ever, he claimed the disclosure was inadvertent.8 The petitioner
stated that he telephoned the attorney out of anger and disclosed
the information because he was "irritated by Capitaland's
behavior."9
According to petitioner's testimony, on July 25, 2000, at
5:50PM, he signed a search warrant based on the allegations of the
presenting officer that "Capitaland permitted an unauthorized
hauler to transport and dispose of hazardous substances, particu-
larly ethylene glycol, an antifreeze, from Capitaland's underground
storage tanks."10 The warrant authorized the executing officers to
"sample the liquids found in the tanks, to dye-test the drains and to
seize documentary evidence pertaining to the transportation or dis-
posal of ethylene glycol and other liquid wastes of Capitaland." 11
According to the Referee's report, shortly after the petitioner
signed the search warrant, he left the court and used his cell phone
to telephone Mr. Towne's law office from his car. 12 The petitioner
left a message on Mr. Towne's voice mail, requesting him to call the
petitioner back.13 When the petitioner arrived home, he tele-
phoned Mr. Towne again, but this time at his home, and left an-
other message on his home voice mail for Mr. Towne to call him
back. 14 Mr. Towne, who was on a fishing trip at that time, returned
the petitioner's phone calls at approximately 7:50 PM that eve-
ning.15 During their brief conversation, the petitioner informed
6. See decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at http:/
/www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/G/gibbons.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2003).
7. Id.
8. See Gibbons, 98 N.Y.2d at 449.
9. Id.
10. See decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at http:/








Mr. Towne that he had just signed a search warrant authorizing the
search of the Capitaland's premises for hazardous wastes, and also
told Mr. Towne that he should contact his client "right away" in
order "to solve the ethylene glycol problem."'16 Mr. Towne did not
inform Capitaland of the impending search; instead, he notified
the Commission of the petitioner's conduct. 17 The search warrant
was executed as scheduled on the morning of July 27, 2000. The
search revealed no hazardous wastes on Capitaland's premises, and
as a result no charges were filed against it.18
The Referee found that petitioner's conduct violated several
Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, in particular, 22 NYCRR
100.1(high standard of conduct), 100.2(A) (impropriety, appear-
ance of impropriety, promoting confidence in integrity of judici-
ary), 100.3(B) (6) (ex parte communication) and
100.3(B) (10) (disclosing non-public information). 19 In addition,
the Referee found that petitioner's purpose in disclosing the infor-
mation was "neither to foil the investigation nor out of his concern
over any environmental law violations." 20 Rather, he found that the
petitioner was frustrated by Capitaland's behavior, particularly be-
cause the petitioner had once helped Capitaland obtain a building
permit for renovations of its premises.2122
Both parties submitted briefs with regard to the Referee's re-
port, and on December 20, 2001, the Commission held oral argu-
ments. 2 3 The Commission agreed with the Referee's finding of
misconduct and it concluded as a matter of law that petitioner's
actions violated Sections 100.1, 100.2(A), 100.2(C), 100.3(B)(6)
16. See decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at http:/
/www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/G/gibbons.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2003).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Gibbons, 98 N.Y.2d at 450.
20. Id.
21. Id; see also decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/G/gibbons.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2003).
22. Capitaland is a client of law firm of Kingsley and Towne. Petitioner was em-
ployed as an associate in this firm from 1996 until September of 1997. Although he was
asked to leave the firm, he left on friendly terms, and continued to refer clients to Mr.
Towne. Mr. Towne had also referred clients to the petitioner.
23. See decision of the New York State Commission on judicial Conduct, at http:/
/www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/G/gibbons.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2003).
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and 100.3(B) (10) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.24 The
Commission found even if the petitioner did not intend to "tip off'
Mr. Towne about the impending search warrant, but acted out of
anger, the petitioner's conduct merited removal.25 It stated that the
petitioner's misconduct was "egregious" and "inconsistent with the
fair and proper administration of justice. '26 The petitioner's ex-
traordinary, ex parte communication 'jeopardized the integrity of
the DEC's search," because Capitaland could have concealed the
hazardous wastes prior to the execution of the search warrant.27
The Commission did not accept petitioner's claim that he did
not intend to disclose the information to Mr. Towne. 28 The peti-
tioner placed not one, but two phone calls to Mr. Towne. 29 Moreo-
ver, nearly two hours had elapsed between the petitioner's first
phone call to Mr. Towne and their actual conversation. 30 Petitioner
had plenty of time to reflect and "recognize that he should say
nothing whatsoever pertaining to the subject [the search war-
rant]. '131 Consequently, he could not claim that the disclosure
merely "slipped out," as he stated at the hearing.3 2 "His persistence
in attempting to contact the attorney, and the opportunity he had
for reflection, suggest a determined, deliberate decision to convey
the message that was conveyed. ' 33 The Commission noted that the
petitioner must take full responsibility for his words and his
actions.3
4
The Commission further stated that even if the facts were as
the petitioner had testified (i.e., he acted out of anger and frustra-
tion and the disclosure merely "slipped out"), such conduct "de-
24. See decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at http:/
/www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/G/gibbons.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2003).
25. See Gibbons, 98 N.Y.2d at 450.
26. Id; see also decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at
http://www.scjcstate.ny.us/determinations/G/gibbons.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2003).
27. See decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at http:/






33. See decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at http:/




picts ajudge who lacks judicial temperament and an understanding
of his judicial role: he assumed the client's guilt upon reading the
search warrant application; he disclosed highly confidential infor-
mation because he was angry and 'lost control'; and he wanted to
tell the attorney to meet with his client immediately to 'solve the
problem' which was the subject of the warrant."35 Even if the disclo-
sure of the search warrant information was inadvertent, which the
Commission believed it was not, such disclosure was a "serious
breach of his [the petitioner's] ethical duties."36
According to the Commission, the petitioner's misconduct was
a "perversion of the judicial process" and it "seriously distorted his
role as a judge and irredeemably damage [d] public confidence in
the integrity of his court."37 It was entirely irrelevant that Mr.
Towne did not act on the information received by the petitioner.38
The Commission cited Matter of Simms v. Comm. on Jud. Conduct, 61
N.Y.2d 349,356 (1984); Matter of Steinberg v. Comm. on Jud. Conduct,
51 N.Y.2d 74,81 (1980); Matter of Mazzei v. Comm. onjud. Conduct, 81
N.Y.2d 568,572 (1993), and stated "[w]hile the extreme sanction of
removal 'is not normally to be imposed for poor judgment, even
extremely poor judgment,' in this case [petitioner's] misconduct
'transcends poor judgment' and is 'truly egregious'.13 9 The Com-
mission accepted the Referee's findings and voted unanimously to
remove the petitioner from his office.4
0
The petitioner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. On
March 26, 2002, upon consideration by the court of appeals on its
own motion, pursuant to NY Constitution, article VI, §22(e) and
(g) and Judiciary Law §44(8) (a) and (c), based upon the peti-
tioner's representation that he "will take a voluntary suspension
without pay from his duties as Town Justice," the court of appeals
suspended the petitioner without pay, pending disposition of his
request for review of a determination by the Commission.41 The
35. See decision of the New York State Commission on judicial Conduct, at http:/






41. See In re Gibbons, 97 N.Y.2d 745 (2002).
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case was argued before the court of appeals on September 11, 2002,
and was decided by it on October 10, 2002.42
III. DISCUSSION
In its rather brief decision, the court of appeals agreed with the
Commission and accepted its determination that the petitioner be
removed from his office. 43 The court was seriously concerned about
the confidentiality of search warrants in both their issuance and
their execution. 44 By informing Mr. Towne of the impending
search, the petitioner committed a "serious breach of trust."45 The
motive for disclosure was irrelevant, "as judges are not free to vio-
late th [at]e [public] trust, whether motivated by sinister design or
by anger."
46
The court stated that maintaining strict confidentiality with re-
gard to search warrants is of paramount importance for effective
law enforcement and fair administration of justice.47 The public
must have complete trust and "full confidence" that judges will not
disclose information regarding judicial matters and proceedings
that require confidentiality. 48 When petitioner informed Mr.
Towne of the search warrant, he 'jeopardized the very legal system
he was duty-bound to protect and administer."49 Further agreeing
with the Commission, the court held that "his [the petitioner's]
conduct goes beyond 'simple careless inattention to the applicable
ethical standards' and instead manifests an 'utter disregard for the
Canons of Judicial Ethics', which warrants his removal (Matter of
Steinberg, 51 N.Y.2d 74,81,82)."50
It is clear from the court's decision that the court found peti-
tioner's misconduct to be so egregious as to demonstrate that he
was no longer fit for judicial service. The court's decision sends a
clear message that even the smallest amount ofjudicial impropriety











regarding strict judicial confidences will not be tolerated. The stan-
dard ofjudicial conduct set by both the Commission and the court
of appeals in this case is extremely high, as it must be, and even
judges with many years of experience risk removal if they disclose
confidential information. It is particularly important to note the
Commission's statement that even if the disclosure of the impend-
ing search warrant was not intentional, but was done out of anger
and frustration, nevertheless, such conduct violated ethical stan-
dards as it demonstrated that the judge lacked 'judicial tempera-
ment and an understanding of his judicial role."5' New York judges
must take maximum precautions to prevent not only intentional,
but also inadvertent disclosures of confidential information in or-
der to preserve the public trust in the justice system. Fair adminis-
tration ofjustice prohibits disclosure of confidential information by
judges.
IV. CONCLUSION
In In re Gibbons, the New York Court of Appeals held that a
judge who disclosed to the attorney that he had just signed a search
warrant for hazardous wastes regarding his client's premises, has
committed a "serious breach of trust" and "his conduct goes beyond
'simple careless inattention to the applicable ethical standards' and
instead manifests an 'utter disregard for the Canons of Judicial Eth-
ics', which warrants his removal (Matter of Steinberg, 51 N.Y.2d
74,81,82) ."52
Ilir Mujalovic
51. See decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, at http:/
/www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/G/gibbons.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2003).
52. See Gibbons, 98 N.Y.2d at 450.
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